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COMMENT
FROM BREARD TO MEDELLIN II: THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON CONSULAR RELATIONS IN PERSPECTIVE
DAVID S. CORBETT
The world is getting smaller. With the first commercial flight of
the new Airbus A380 superjumbo on October 25 of last year, it is
now possible for 853 passengers to fly nonstop across two continents
in the same plane.1 The number of people traveling internationally
has increased considerably within the last fifteen years and the United
States is as popular as ever as an international travel destination.2 In
2006 alone, nearly fifty-one million international visitors came to the
United States and more than sixty-three million U.S. residents went
abroad.3 In 2007, the number of scheduled flights worldwide increased by 4.7% to 29.6 million, or 80,987 individual takeoffs per
day.4 With so many people crossing so many borders on a daily basis,
it stands to reason that occasionally some of them get into trouble,
and Americans are no exception.
Four thousand four hundred fifty-six Americans were arrested
abroad in 2006, nearly a thousand more than the previous year.5 Being arrested or detained in a foreign country is a nightmare scenario
for many, especially if there is a language barrier between the author1. Press Association, Superjumbo Completes First Commercial Flight, GUARDIAN, Oct. 25,
2007, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2007/oct/25/theairlineindustry.australia;
Spiegel Online, A380 Maiden Flight Reaches Sydney, BUS. WK., Oct. 25, 2007, http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/content/oct2007/gb20071025_054721.htm?chan=Globalbiz_europe+index+page_top+stories.
2. See OFFICE OF TRAVEL AND TOURISM INDUS., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, TOTAL INTERNATIONAL TRAVELERS VOLUME TO AND FROM THE U.S. 1996–2006 (2007), http://tinet.ita.doc.gov/
outreachpages/inbound.total_intl_travel_volume_19962006.html; OFFICE OF TRAVEL AND TOURISM INDUS., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, INTERNATIONAL ARRIVALS TO U.S. – HISTORICAL VISITATION 1994–2000 (2003), http://tinet.ita.doc.gov/view/f-2000-04-001/index.html.
3. OFFICE OF TRAVEL AND TOURISM INDUS., INTERNATIONAL ARRIVALS TO U.S. – HISTORICAL VISITATION 1994–2000, supra note 2.
4. OAG Reports 29.5 Million Flights Worldwide, BREAKING TRAVEL NEWS, Dec. 14, 2007,
http://www.breakingtravelnews.com/article/20071214104331417.
5. Christopher Reynolds, Arrested Abroad: A Rare Glimpse of Trips Gone Wrong, L.A.
TIMES, Oct. 23, 2007, at para. 7, available at http://travel.latimes.com/articles/la-tr-insider28
oct28.
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ities and the traveler. Luckily, diplomatic relations between governments mean that there is often a consulate of the traveler’s home
country in the area of the world in which he or she is being detained.
The United States, for example, has over 290 embassies, consulates
and diplomatic missions around the world.6 These facilities spend a
considerable amount of time each year helping Americans who find
themselves in legal trouble abroad. The U.S. State Department proclaims that “[c]onsular personnel at U.S. Embassies and Consulates
abroad and in the U.S. are available 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, to
provide emergency assistance to U.S. citizens.”7 This begs the question: How does an American abroad or a foreign national visiting the
United States know to contact their consulate if they find themselves
on the wrong side of the law? Enter the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.
The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR or the
Convention),8 proposed in 1963 and ratified by the United States in
1969, codifies “the rights and obligations of member states with respect to consular relations.”9 In essence, the VCCR maintains the
lines of communication between a foreign national and his home government while he is abroad.10 Should that foreign national be arrested
or detained while abroad, Article 36 of the VCCR requires that he be
informed “without delay” of his right to communicate with his consulate and, if he so wishes, that his consulate be notified of his detention.11 One hundred seventy countries, including the United States,
have signed and ratified the VCCR,12 thus indicating its importance
to international relations. In conjunction with the Vienna Convention
on Diplomatic Relations (VCDR)13 and the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected
Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents (CPPC),14 the VCCR is the
6. U.S. Dep’t of State, Websites of U.S. Embassies, Consulates, and Diplomatic Missions,
http://usembassy.state.gov (last visited Sept. 11, 2008).
7. U.S. Dep’t of State, Tips for Traveling Abroad, http://travel.state.gov/travel/tips/
tips_1232.html (last visited Sept. 11, 2008).
8. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S.
261 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
9. William J. Aceves, The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations: A Study of Rights,
Wrongs, and Remedies, 31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 257, 259 (1998).
10. Id.
11. Vienna Convention, supra note 8, art. 36, para. 1(b).
12. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 337 (2006).
13. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 500
U.N.T.S. 95.
14. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 14, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975, 1035 U.N.T.S. 167.
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backbone of international diplomatic law.15 As a treaty to which the
United States is a party, the Supremacy Clause located in Article VI
of the U.S. Constitution dictates that the VCCR is “the supreme Law
of the Land” and that “every State shall be bound thereby.”16 With
this in mind, it is difficult to say whether it is more troubling that
until relatively recently the VCCR was little known in U.S. law enforcement circles,17 or that now that it has come to the fore, the U.S.
Supreme Court has failed to treat it as the binding law that it is. This
article proposes that Congress must now act swiftly to ensure full
VCCR compliance. Not only does America’s declining image
strongly recommend such congressional action, but the protection of
millions of American citizens traveling abroad demands it.
To develop this thesis, Part I of this article will address U.S.
compliance with the VCCR from an external, or international, perspective through the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice (ICJ). This section will educate the reader on the legal
developments that have begun to shape an important issue on the
cusp of domestic and international jurisprudence. Part II will focus on
the domestic jurisprudence affecting VCCR compliance within the
United States, focusing on recent pertinent Supreme Court decisions.
Primarily, this section will highlight and analyze the increasingly
complex relationship between the ICJ and the U.S. criminal justice
system. Part III will identify and attempt to answer questions left unanswered by Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, and Medellin v. Texas, the
two latest U.S. Supreme Court decisions dealing with the VCCR. 18
These questions include whether the VCCR confers privately enforceable rights on foreign individuals and whether future U.S. compliance with the VCCR is a vain hope. This final section looks at the
urgent role of Congress in the matter and proposes options for Congress to ensure compliance with the VCCR.
While I hope that this organizational scheme will allow the international and domestic components of VCCR compliance to be
considered separately, it must be understood that they are not, of
course, actually independent. Take note that many of the judicial
15. Asa Markel, The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations: After the Federal Courts’
Abdication, Will State Courts Fill in the Breach?, 7 CHI.-KENT J. INT’L COMP. L. 1, 3 (2007).
16. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
17. Frederic L. Kirgis, President Bush’s Determination Regarding Mexican Nationals and
Consular Convention Rights, ASIL INSIGHTS, Mar. 2005, para. 2, http://www.asil.org/insights/
2005/03/insights050309.html [hereinafter Kirgis, Bush’s Determination].
18. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331 (2006); Medellin v. Texas (Medellin II), 128 S.
Ct. 1346 (2008).
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events I attempt to explain occur, not in the order I address them, but
concurrently and in concert with each other. Finally, it is important to
bear in mind that neither the ICJ nor the U.S. Supreme Court is operating in a vacuum: they are in dialog with each other and approach
the same issues with dissimilar mandates.
PART I – AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE
International public opinion of the United States has plummeted over
the past decade, and as a result, many Americans abroad find themselves
apologizing for the policies of their government.19 If the ignominy that the
United States has experienced abroad in recent years was born from policy
differences alone, there would be a strong argument that the situation is an
acceptable corollary of being the world’s only superpower. The reality,
however, is that the United States is perceived as not just heavy-handed, but
also as considering itself above the law. The United States advocates nuclear nonproliferation, and yet in the forty years since it signed the Treaty
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), it has largely maintained its nuclear arsenal and made little progress toward “complete disarmament.”20 The United States condemns human rights abuses in China,
Russia and Zimbabwe, among other countries, while prisoners are abused
and held without charge by U.S. forces in Iraq, Guantanamo Bay21 and at
undisclosed CIA black sites.22 These (at least perceived) hypocrisies are at
the heart of international ill will towards the United States and remind those
who are paying attention of the (again, at least perceived) arrogance with
which the United States has appeared to disregard both the VCCR and related rulings by the ICJ.
19. Jan Friedmann, Exchange Students Find a New Way to Deal with Germans, SPIEGEL
ONLINE INT’L, July 26, 2007, http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,496731,00.
html; U.S. Needs to Go Goodwill Hunting, WASH. POST, Sept. 30, 2005, at A17, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/09/29/AR2005092902128.html.
20. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons art. VI, opened for signature July 1,
1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161; Union of Concerned Scientists, U.S. Nuclear Weapons
Policy: Dangerous and Counterproductive, Sept. 23, 2004, http://www.ucsusa.org/global_security/nuclear_weapons/us-nuclear-weapons-policy-dangerous-and-counterproductive.html.
21. The U.S. Supreme Court’s recent ruling in the case of Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct.
2229 (2008), while a welcome step in the right direction, does little to ease the actual suffering of
those held as enemy combatants at the U.S. Naval base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Although the
decision does allow trials for the prisoners, no time frame is set for when the trials will begin and
other questions remain about the ability to provide adequate due process. See id.
22. U.S. Condemns Global Rights Abuses, BBC NEWS, Mar. 4, 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hi/americas/1854419.stm; Dana Priest, CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Secret Prisons, WASH.
Post, Nov. 2, 2005, at A01, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/
2005/11/01/AR2005110101644.html; Guantanamos in Europe?, SPIEGEL ONLINE INT’L, Nov. 7,
2005, http://www.spiegel.de/international/0,1518,383670,00.html; see U.S. Raps Russia and Saudi
Rights, BBC NEWS, Feb. 28, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4305677.stm; Jannat Jalil,
Guantanamo Condemned Two Years On, BBC NEWS, Jan. 11, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
americas/3386513.stm.
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The ICJ, sometimes known as the World Court, is the principal judicial
organ of the United Nations.23 Article I of the Optional Protocol to the
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes (Optional Protocol)24 states that “[d]isputes arising out
of the interpretation or application of the Convention shall lie within the
compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice.”25 The United
States itself proposed the Optional Protocol in 1963 and ratified it with the
rest of the VCCR in 1969.26 The United States was also the first country to
invoke the protocol before the ICJ when it successfully sued Iran over the
1979 hostage crisis.27 Since 1998, the United States has been brought
before the ICJ for noncompliance with Article 36 of the VCCR three times
by three different States: Paraguay, Germany, and Mexico.28 What follows
is an overview of the ICJ’s involvement in each of these cases.
Paraguay v. United States (1998)
In 1986, Angel Francisco Breard, a dual citizen of Paraguay and Argentina, came to the United States on a student visa.29 In 1993, Mr. Breard,
then twenty-seven years old, was convicted of the attempted rape and capital murder of thirty-nine-year-old Ruth Dickie by the Circuit Court of Arlington County, Virginia and sentenced to death.30 Mr. Breard was never
informed by the arresting authorities of his right to consular notification and
assistance under Article 36 of the VCCR.31 On April 3, 1998, eleven days
prior to Mr. Breard’s scheduled execution, Paraguay began proceedings
against the United States before the ICJ.32 Six days later, on April 9, 1998,
the ICJ issued a unanimous Order ruling that the United States take “all
measures at its disposal” to prevent the execution of Mr. Breard pending the
final resolution of the case brought before the ICJ by Paraguay.33 The ICJ
was authorized to issue this Order by Article 41 of the ICJ Statute, which
23. International Court of Justice, The Court, http://www.icj-cij.org/court/index.php?p1=1&
PHPSESSID=C6823a2fa0d313e2baf6ecd904634d2f (last visited Sept.12, 2008).
24. Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 325, 596 U.N.T.S. 487, available at
http://fletcher.tufts.edu/multi/texts/BH444.txt.
25. Id. art. I.
26. The International Justice Project, International Instruments, http://www.internationaljusticeproject.org/nationalsInstruments.cfm (last visited Sept. 15, 2008).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Republic of Paraguay v. Allen, 949 F. Supp. 1269, 1271 (E.D. Va. 1996).
30. Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 372 (1998).
31. Peter Bekker & Keith Highet, International Court of Justice Orders United States to Stay
Execution of Paraguayan National in Virginia, ASIL INSIGHTS, Apr. 1998, para. 2, http://
www.asil.org/insights/insigh17.htm.
32. Memorial of the Republic of Paraguay, Case Concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations pt. 2.31 (Paraguay v. U.S.) (Oct. 9, 1998), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/
docket/files/99/13106.pdf.
33. Bekker & Highet, supra note 31, para. 1.
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gives the fifteen-judge court the power to issue injunctive relief in the form
of provisional measures of protection so that the respective rights of the
parties can be preserved pending the court’s final decision.34 In response,
on April 13, 1998, the U.S. Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, officially requested the Virginian Governor to halt the execution of Mr.
Breard.35 The U.S. Supreme Court, whose decision in this case is discussed
in detail in Part II of this article, also left the decision up to the Virginian
Governor, who subsequently refused to block the execution.36 After Mr.
Breard’s death the Paraguayan government discontinued the proceedings
before the ICJ and no final judgment was rendered.37
Germany v. United States (2001)
On March 2, 1999, the Federal Republic of Germany (Germany) filed
in the Registry of the ICJ a complaint against the United States based on an
alleged violation of Article 36 of the VCCR.38 That same day, Germany
also filed a separate request for the indication of provisional measures—the
same Order that was issued in the Breard case to delay the execution until
the case was resolved.39 The subjects of this case were Karl and Walter
LaGrand—two German brothers who had been living in the United
States.40 The LaGrand brothers were arrested, convicted of attempted robbery and first degree murder in connection with a failed bank robbery in
Arizona, and sentenced to death.41 Despite the arresting authorities’ knowledge that the LaGrands were not U.S. citizens, the LaGrands were never
notified of their rights to consular assistance under the VCCR.42 Karl and
Walter LaGrand were executed by the state of Arizona on June 27, 2001—
before the ICJ issued a judgment on the merits of their case.43 The ICJ ruled
(1) that the United States had breached its obligations to Germany under
34. Id.; see Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 41, available at http://www.icjcij.org/documents/index.php?p1=4&p2=2&p3=0#CHAPTER_III.
35. Constanze Schulte, Jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice: Order Issued in
the Case Concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Paraguay v. United States of
America), 9 EUR. J. INT’L L. 761, 762 (1998).
36. Id.
37. Frederic L. Kirgis, The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Decides Medellin’s Consular
Convention Case, ASIL INSIGHTS, Dec. 8, 2006, para. 3, available at http://www.asil.org/insights/
2006/12/insights061208.html#_ednref6 [hereinafter Kirgis, Texas Court].
38. LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466, 470 (Judgment of June 27).
39. Id.
40. Frederic L. Kirgis, World Court Rules Against the United States in LaGrand Case Arising from a Violation of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, ASIL INSIGHTS, July 2001,
para. 1, available at http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh75.htm [hereinafter Kirgis, World Court
Rules Against the United States].
41. Id. para. 3.
42. LaGrand Case, 2001 I.C.J. at 475; Kirgis, World Court Rules Against the United States,
supra note 40, para. 1.
43. LaGrand Case, 2001 I.C.J. at 478–80.
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Article 36 of the VCCR;44 (2) that although the procedural default rule applied by the federal trial court to deny relief to the LaGrand brothers on
their habeas corpus petition does not by itself violate Article 36 of the
VCCR, in the context of this case it did since it prevented Germany from
giving timely assistance to the brothers;45 and (3) that an order of provisional measures under Article 41 of its own Statute, such as the one issued
in this case to prevent the execution of Walter LaGrand, created a legal
obligation that the United States breached.46 These findings set up a direct
confrontation between the ICJ and the U.S. Supreme Court that is still playing out.
Mexico v. United States (2003)
The latest case against the United States to come before the ICJ was
initiated by Mexico in January of 2003.47 In the Case Concerning Avena
and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of America), Mexico alleged that the United States had violated Article 36 of the VCCR in
fifty-four separate cases involving Mexican nationals who had subsequently
been convicted and sentenced to death in the United States.48
The ICJ issued its decision on the merits of Avena on March 31, 2004.
The court found that the United States had breached its obligations under
the VCCR by (1) failing to inform fifty-one of the fifty-four Mexican nationals named in the suit, without delay, of their rights under Article 36 of
the VCCR;49 (2) failing to notify the appropriate Mexican consular post,
without delay, of the detention of forty-nine Mexican citizens, thereby depriving Mexico of the right to render assistance to its nationals;50 (3) by
“depriving Mexico of the right to communicate with, and have access to, 49
Mexican nationals in a timely fashion;”51 (4) by depriving Mexico of the
right to arrange, in a timely fashion, for legal representation of thirty-four
Mexican nationals;52 and (5) by “not permitting the review and reconsideration, in light of the rights set forth in the Vienna Convention, of the convictions and sentences of three Mexican nationals currently awaiting
execution.”53 In view of these violations, the ICJ held that the United States
must provide “by means of its own choosing, review and reconsideration of
44. Id. at 515.
45. Id. at 515–16.
46. Id. at 516.
47. Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12, 17
(Judgment of Mar. 31).
48. Id. at 19–20.
49. Id. at 71.
50. Id.
51. William J. Aceves, Consular Notification and the Death Penalty: The ICJ’s Judgment in
Avena, ASIL INSIGHTS, Apr. 2004, para. 9, http://www.asil.org/insigh130.cfm; Avena, 2004 I.C.J.
at 71–72.
52. Avena, 2004 I.C.J. at 72.
53. Aceves, supra note 51, para. 9; Avena, 2004 I.C.J. at 72.
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the convictions and sentences of the Mexican nationals.”54 The court took
care to indicate that the review and reconsideration required of the United
States could not be barred by procedural default as held by the U.S. Supreme Court in Breard.55 It stated that the rights guaranteed under the
VCCR “are treaty rights which the United States has undertaken to comply
with in relation to the individual concerned, irrespective of the due process
rights under United States constitutional law.”56 Going further still, the ICJ
specifically addressed the clemency process and noted that, “as currently
practised [sic] within the United States criminal justice system . . . it is . . .
not sufficient in itself to serve as an appropriate means of ‘review and reconsideration’ as envisaged by the Court . . . .”57
This second judgment against the United States in the course of three
years induced what at first seemed a curious and tangled response. The U.S.
Supreme Court’s treatment of two of the cases included in the Avena judgment will be explored in detail in Part II of this article, but the reaction of
the Bush administration is worth mentioning here. Until late February 2005,
the administration’s response to ICJ decisions declaring the United States in
violation of the VCCR had been “simply to apologize to the governments
whose nationals were convicted, and to issue instructions to law enforcement officials in the United States on the requirements of the convention.”58
On February 28, 2005, however, President Bush issued a memorandum to
then Attorney General Alberto Gonzales determining that the relevant state
courts should comply with the ICJ’s decision in Avena.59 In relevant part,
the memorandum stated that the President had
determined, pursuant to the authority vested in [him] as President
by the Constitution and laws of the United States, that the United
States will discharge its international obligations under the decision of the International Court of Justice in the Case Concerning
Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of
America), 2004 I.C.J. 128 [sic] (Mar. 31), by having state courts
give effect to the decision in accordance with general principles
of comity in cases filed by the 51 Mexican nationals addressed in
that decision.60
54. Avena, 2004 I.C.J. at 72.
55. Breard, 523 U.S. at 375–76 (“It is the rule in this country that assertions of error in
criminal proceedings must first be raised in state court in order to form the basis for relief in
habeas. Claims not so raised are considered defaulted.” (citing Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72
(1977))).
56. Avena, 2004 I.C.J. at 65 (emphasis added).
57. Id. at 66.
58. Kirgis, Bush’s Determination, supra note 17, para. 5.
59. Adam Liptak, Texas Court Ruling Rebuffs Bush and World Court, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16,
2006, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/16/washington/16death.html?_r=1&oref=
slogin.
60. Kirgis, Bush’s Determination, supra note 17, para. 6 (citing the Brief for the United
States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent in Medellin, 544 U.S. 660 (No. 04-5928), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/osg/briefs/2004/3mer/1ami/2004-5928.mer.ami.html).
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This was a surprising reaction to the Avena decision given that the Bush
Administration’s stance towards international bodies such as the United Nations had, until this point, been less than warm.61 Following this memorandum there was much debate as to whether the President had exceeded his
authority by ordering review of the cases in Avena, but that issue will be
discussed in Part II.62
The second development that came in the wake of the ICJ’s decision in
Avena was the U.S. unilateral withdrawal from the Optional Protocol which
gives the ICJ jurisdiction over the United States to hear disputes relating to
the VCCR.63 The withdrawal came on March 7, 2005, in a letter from Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to then U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan.64 While the withdrawal from the Optional Protocol had no effect on
the U.S. commitment to the VCCR itself, and while it did not nullify the
existing ICJ decisions against the United States, the withdrawal does mean
that with regard to the VCCR, the ICJ no longer has jurisdiction over the
United States. This second prong of the response to Avena brought the Bush
Administration’s overall strategy into focus. Faced with two judgments
against the United States in three years, the Administration moved first to
take the issue of whether violation of the VCCR requires review and reconsideration of the cases involved, as the ICJ had ruled, as well as the issue of
what weight an ICJ decision carries within the U.S. judicial system away
from the U.S. Supreme Court. By instructing the state courts to comply with
the ICJ ruling as the President’s memorandum did, the precedential power
of any subsequent review and reconsideration was contained considerably.
Next, withdrawal from the Optional Protocol had the effect of cutting U.S.
losses at the hands of the ICJ, thereby limiting the chances that the Supreme
Court and the ICJ would ever again come into direct conflict over the
VCCR. These two steps, taken a week apart, controlled and limited the
effect of the Avena decision while concurrently reestablishing the U.S. sovereignty in the sphere of criminal justice.
PART II – DOMESTIC VCCR JURISPRUDENCE
Since the first provisional measure for protection was handed down in
the Breard case by the ICJ in 1998, the U.S. judicial branch has grappled
61. See Adam Liptak, U.S. Says It Has Withdrawn From World Judicial Body, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 10, 2005, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/10/politics/10death.html?scp=1&
sq=U.S.+optional+protocol&st=nyt.
62. Kirgis, Bush’s Determination, supra note 17, para. 7; Jack King, President Tries to Moot
Texas Death Row Case; Withdraws from Treaty Provision, NAT’L ASS’N CRIM. DEF. LAW. NEWS
& ISSUES, Apr. 7, 2005, available at http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/freeform/3665313366581B
AB85256FDC00591BF4?OpenDocument.
63. Liptak, supra note 61; Charles Lane, U.S. Quits Pact Used in Capital Cases, WASH.
POST, Mar. 10, 2005, at A01, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A219
81-2005Mar9.html.
64. Lane, supra note 63; Liptak, supra note 61.
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with how decisions of an international tribunal about the VCCR should fit
into the U.S. criminal justice system. There are those who say that international judicial opinions have no place in our domestic system, some of
whom sit on our nation’s highest court. This view is not without merit. We
are a sovereign nation with a rich common law history that has been carefully and judiciously developed by Americans for Americans. The flaw in
this reasoning, however, lies in the fact that as one of the most prosperous,
and certainly the most powerful, country on an earth that is increasingly
easy to traverse, American laws are not just for Americans anymore. As
discussed in the introduction to this article, international travel is no longer
limited to the wealthy, and an increasing number of people find themselves
abroad for an ever-growing number of reasons. When those people, be they
U.S. citizens traveling outside the United States or foreign nationals traveling inside the United States, find themselves in trouble with the law they
need to be able to rely on the protections afforded them by the VCCR. If the
consequences for the absence of these protections, as adjudicated by the
tribunal specially charged with the task, can simply be smothered by procedural rules in the United States, then what chance do U.S. citizens have
abroad? This section of the article aims to provide an overview to the treatment the U.S. Supreme Court has given to the cases underlying the ICJ
decisions discussed in Part I as well as a brief outline of an additional case
that never visited the ICJ.
Breard v. Greene (1998)
On August 20, 1996, eighteen months before his case came before the
ICJ, Mr. Angel Francisco Breard filed a motion for habeas corpus relief in
federal district court alleging that the arresting authorities had violated the
VCCR when they failed to inform him that, as a foreign national, he had the
right to contact the Paraguayan Consulate.65 Ignoring the catch-22 it was
creating for VCCR cases, the court concluded that Breard had procedurally
defaulted on this claim by failing to raise it in state court.66 The procedural
default rule, as outlined in Coleman v. Thompson,67 states that
[j]ust as in those cases in which a state prisoner fails to exhaust
state remedies, a habeas petitioner who has failed to meet the
State’s procedural requirements for presenting his federal claims
has deprived the state courts of an opportunity to address those
claims in the first instance. A habeas petitioner who has defaulted
his federal claims in state court meets the technical requirements
65. Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 373 (1998).
66. Id.; see Breard v. Netherland, 949 F. Supp. 1255, 1266 (E.D. Va. 1996), aff’d sub nom.
Breard v. Pruett, 134 F.3d 615 (4th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 371 (1998).
67. 501 U.S. 722 (1991).
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for exhaustion; there are no state remedies any longer “available”
to him.68
The decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.69
Mr. Breard then petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.70
In 1996, while Mr. Breard’s original VCCR claim was pending in federal
court, Paraguayan officials brought a suit against certain Virginia officials
alleging that their rights under the Vienna Convention had been violated
when Breard was not informed of his treaty rights and the Paraguayan consulate was not informed of Breard’s situation.71 Ultimately, the district
court concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the claims.72
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s
decision and Paraguay also petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of
certiorari.73
The primary issues that faced the Supreme Court in deciding whether
or not to grant certiorari were whether Mr. Breard and the various
Paraguayan diplomats were entitled to receive a stay of execution and other
relief, respectively, under the VCCR. In a per curiam opinion that denied
certiorari on both cases, the Court answered both prongs of this question in
the negative.74 The majority of the Court concluded that procedural default
did apply and, as a result, Breard could not raise his VCCR claim on federal
habeas corpus review.75 With regard to the fact that as a treaty the VCCR is
the “supreme Law of the Land,”76 the Court, citing Reid v. Covert,77 found
that “when a statute which is subsequent in time is inconsistent with a
treaty, the statute to the extent of conflict renders the treaty null.”78 Using
this reasoning, the Court held that the 1996 Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act (AEDPA),79 “provides that a habeas petitioner alleging
that he is held in violation of ‘treaties of the United States’ will, as a general
rule, not be afforded an evidentiary hearing if he ‘has failed to develop the
factual basis of [the] claim in State court proceedings.’”80 With these findings, the Supreme Court cemented procedural default as a bar to review of
cases claiming violation of the VCCR.
68. Id. at 731–32; see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (2006); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 125–26,
n.28 (1982).
69. Breard, 523 U.S. at 373; see Breard v. Pruett, 134 F.3d at 620.
70. Breard, 523 U.S. at 373.
71. Id. at 374.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 375–79.
75. Id. at 375–76.
76. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
77. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 18 (1957) (plurality opinion).
78. Breard, 523 U.S. at 376; see also Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888) (holding that if a treaty and a federal statute conflict, “[T]he one last in date will control the other
. . . .”).
79. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a), (e)(2) (1996).
80. Breard, 523 U.S. at 376 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a), (e)(2) (1994 ed., Supp. IV)).
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Medellin v. Dretke (2005 & 2008)
José Ernesto Medellı́n Rojas (Mr. Medellı́n) is a Mexican national who
was convicted by a Texas state court of the gang rape and capital murder of
two teenage girls on June 24, 1993.81 Mr. Medellı́n, who was sentenced to
death after his conviction, was never informed of his rights under the
VCCR when he was arrested and became one of the fifty-four Mexican
nationals whose cases were before the ICJ in Avena.82 Mr. Medellı́n appealed his conviction in both Texas state court and later in federal court
through a preliminary petition for a writ of habeas corpus.83 Although Mr.
Medellı́n’s petition was denied in federal district court, he filed a timely
notice of appeal and his case was reviewed by the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals.84 The Fifth Circuit affirmed the denial of the petition noting that
Mr. Medellı́n’s VCCR claim failed both because it was procedurally defaulted and because the VCCR does not confer an individually enforceable
right.85 This second reason sparked heated debate and, as it is an issue that
the Supreme Court has not yet directly addressed, its strengths and weaknesses are analyzed in Part III of this article.
Mr. Medellı́n next appealed to the Supreme Court and a writ of certiorari was granted.86 Shortly thereafter, however, President Bush’s memorandum ordering compliance with the ICJ’s ruling in Avena was released and,
in reliance on the memorandum, Mr. Medellı́n filed an application for a writ
of habeas corpus in the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals.87 On the reasoning that “this state-court proceeding may provide Medellı́n with the very
reconsideration of his Vienna Convention claim that he now seeks in the
present proceeding,” the Supreme Court dismissed the writ of certiorari as
improvidently granted.88 As mentioned above, this essentially left the Supreme Court off the hook, allowing it to pass on deciding whether U.S.
courts are bound by the ICJ’s ruling that the United States must reconsider
the cases of those named in Avena without regard to procedural default
doctrines and also “whether a federal court should give effect, as a matter of
judicial comity and uniform treaty interpretation, to the ICJ’s judgment.”89
The manner in which the Supreme Court disposed of Mr. Medellı́n’s case
81. Medellin v. Dretke, 371 F.3d 270, 273–74 (5th Cir. 2004) (per curiam).
82. Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12, 25
(Judgment of Mar. 31).
83. Medellin, 371 F.3d at 274.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 279–80.
86. Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court Drops Case Ruled on by World Court, N.Y. TIMES,
May 24, 2005, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/24/politics/24treaty.html?_r=1&
scp=1&sq=justices+drop+capital+case+ruled+on+by+world+court&st=nyt&oref=login.
87. Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660, 663 (2005) (per curiam) (dismissal of federal writ as
improvidently granted).
88. Id. at 662.
89. Id.
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was controversial even among the Court’s members,90 but an in-depth discussion of the procedural issues raised is, though undoubtedly worthwhile,
unfortunately beyond the scope of this article. Suffice it to say that those
who expected Medellı́n v. Dretke to be the case that defined the relationship
between the ICJ and the U.S. criminal justice system were disappointed and
Mr. Medellı́n took his case back to Texas.
Once there, Mr. Medellı́n found the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
less than sympathetic to his cause and unimpressed by either the ICJ decision ordering a review of his case notwithstanding procedural default, or by
the memorandum issued by the country’s highest ranking diplomat directing that the ICJ decision be honored.91 In a lengthy opinion that examines, inter alia, the United Nations Charter and the Statute of the
International Court of Justice, the court cited the Supreme Court’s decision
in Breard in holding that ICJ decisions are not binding on U.S. courts and
that they were therefore under no obligation to set aside the procedural default rules for Mr. Medellı́n.92 With regard to the President’s memorandum,
the court held that it did not amount to an executive order and that President
Bush had consequently “exceeded his constitutional authority by intruding
into the independent powers of the judiciary.”93 The resulting appeal was
filed before the ink was dry on the Texas Court of Criminal Appeal’s opinion and on April 30, 2007, certiorari was granted to Mr. Medellı́n for the
second time in three years.94 Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Roberts
held that the decision of the ICJ in Avena does not “constitute binding federal law that preempts state restrictions on the filing of successive habeas
petitions,”95 and that President Bush exceeded his constitutional authority
when he issued the memorandum ordering state courts to comply with the
Avena decision.96 Next, I will explore the Court’s reasoning in coming to
these two conclusions.
In finding that the ICJ’s Avena judgment has no binding effect in domestic U.S. courts, the Court’s primary basis is that the VCCR is a nonself-executing treaty, and so the ICJ’s holding requires additional congressional action to be enforced.97 Despite its best efforts, however, the Court
could find no evidence in the text of the VCCR to hint at whether or not it
was intended to be self-executing.98 Faced with this conundrum, the majority reads a presumption against self-execution into the history of treaty in90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
time).
95.
96.
97.
98.

Greenhouse, supra note 86.
Ex parte Medellin, 223 S.W.3d 315 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
Id. at 332.
Id. at 335.
Medellin v. Texas, 127 S. Ct. 2129 (2007) (mem.) (certiorari granted for the second
Medellin v. Texas (Medellin II), 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1367 (2008).
Id. at 1372.
Id. at 1356–57.
Id. at 1358.
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terpretation in the United States.99 However, the dissent devotes many
pages to carefully chronicling the Court’s legacy of treaty interpretation,
and the origins of the very idea of self-executing and non-self-executing
treaties, and comes to the opposite conclusion.100 In support of the idea that
there is no presumption against self-executing treaties, Justice Breyer notes
that
by 1840, instances in which treaty provisions automatically became part of domestic law were common enough for one Justice
to write that “it would be a bold proposition” to assert “that an act
of Congress must be first passed” in order to give a treaty effect
as “a supreme law of the land.”101
Additionally, the Supreme Court has previously “held that the United States
may be obligated by treaty to comply with the judgment of an international
tribunal interpreting that treaty, despite the absence of any congressional
enactment specifically requiring such compliance.”102 If there was once, as
Justice Breyer very convincingly argues, a presumption in favor of treaties
being self-executing, but the passage of time has eroded that presumption,
then it is necessary to pinpoint the moment at which the presumption disappeared. It is surprising, to say the least, that the conservative wing of the
Court should espouse vague arguments about the evolution of such presumptions. The Justices who form the majority in Medellin II point with
disdain to Justice Breyer’s seven-step analysis for determining whether or
not a treaty is self-executing and yet his is the voice of history, the voice of
continuity, the voice of precedent. I am open, as I imagine Justice Breyer is,
to the possibility that the presumption that once existed in favor of treaties
being self-executing is no longer valid. What must not be ignored, however, is the fact that Justice Breyer’s purpose was to illustrate not the continuing existence of a presumption in favor of self-executing treaties, but
rather the complete absence of a presumption against such treaties. It is this
opposite presumption that the majority uses to prop up its finding that the
ICJ’s Avena decision requires legislative action before it can be given
effect.
Next, the majority concludes that the language of the Optional Protocol should be read as a “bare grant of jurisdiction,” merely submitting the
United States to the jurisdiction of the ICJ for the purposes of dispute resolution, but saying nothing of whether the United States must then be bound
by a resulting decision.103 To this argument is added a critique of Article 94
99. Id. at 1357 n.3 (quoting the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) of FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 907 cmt. a (1986)).
100. Id. at 1377–81 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
101. Medellin v. Texas (Medellin II), 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1379 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(quoting Lessee of Pollard’s Heirs v. Kibbe, 39 U.S. 353, 388 (1840) (Baldwin, J., concurring)).
102. Id. at 1380 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 1349.
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of the U.N. Charter, from which even the majority admits the “obligation on
the part of signatory nations to comply with ICJ judgments [is] derive[d]”
(which seems to indicate that there is, in fact, an obligation).104 “Article
94(1) provides that ‘[e]ach Member of the United Nations undertakes to
comply with the decision of the [ICJ] in any case to which it is a party.’”105
The Court maintains that the words “undertakes to comply” indicate a
rather formless “commitment . . . to take future action” through the legislature to comply with ICJ decisions.106 By parsing the language in this way,
the Court has made U.S. compliance not mandatory but optional.
There are two characteristics of the American political system which,
when combined, have the almost certainly unintended consequence of allowing the United States to enter into international agreements with which
it cannot comply. These characteristics are federalism and dualism. Federalism, or the separation between and independence of the federal and state
governments,107 and more specifically, federal and state law enforcement
agencies, can lead to an uneven and inconsistent application of federal law.
Dualism, or separation between the legislative and executive branches of
government, allows the executive to enter into a treaty which cannot be
enforced without the independent action of the legislature. In the case of the
VCCR, the twin properties of federalism and dualism have combined in a
kind of perfect storm, rendering the United States unable to live up to its
international commitment. Shielded as it is by this impasse, U.S. noncompliance with the VCCR suddenly becomes not just an option, but the only
option. In this scenario, Mexico’s only recourse is to the U.N. Security
Council, which is, of course, powerless to act against the United States.
The Court next turned its attention to the issue of whether President
Bush possessed the authority to instruct state courts to abide by the ICJ’s
Avena decision. In deciding this question, the Court references “Justice
Jackson’s familiar tripartite scheme”108 from Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.
v. Sawyer.109 Observing “[t]hat comprehensive and undefined presidential
powers hold both practical advantages and grave dangers for the country,”110 and recognizing that judicial opinions “often suffer the infirmity of
confusing the issue of a power’s validity with the cause it is invoked to
promote, [or] of confounding the permanent executive office with its temporary occupant,”111 Justice Jackson laid out three categories into which
104. Id. at 1358.
105. Id. (quoting U.N. Charter art. 92) (emphasis added by the Court).
106. Id. at 1349.
107. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 644 (8th ed. 2004) (defining federalism as “[t]he legal
relationship and distribution of power between the national and regional governments within a
federal system of government.”).
108. Medellin II, 128 S. Ct. at 1350.
109. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
110. Id. at 634.
111. Id.
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presidential actions fall for the purpose of determining the strength of authority upon which any such action rests. These categories are: (1) “When
the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum”;112 (2) “When the President acts in
absence of either a congressional grant or denial of authority, he can only
rely upon his own independent powers”;113 and (3) “When the President
takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb.”114 Taken together, these categories
stand for the proposition that “[t]he President’s authority to act, as with the
exercise of any governmental power, ‘must stem either from an act of Congress or from the Constitution itself.’”115
After overlaying the President’s memorandum with Justice Jackson’s
scheme, the Medellin II Court held that the President had neither the express constitutional power nor congressional authorization to order the
states to review the cases encompassed in Avena. The Court then examined
whether Congress may have acquiesced in the President’s actions. Here,
too, the Court came to the conclusion that “[t]he President’s Memorandum
is not supported by a ‘particularly longstanding practice’ of congressional
acquiescence” such as supports his authority to resolve claims disputes with
foreign nations.116 His actions were, in fact, “unprecedented” and therefore
could not be said to enjoy the blessing of Congress.117
In this instance too, however, the arguments of the dissent are more
compelling than those relied upon by the majority. While it seems clear that
under the Youngstown scheme, the President cannot be said to have explicit
constitutional authority nor the express support of Congress, under the circumstances it seems that Congress has indeed acquiesced in the President’s
exercise of authority. Congress is certainly not known for its agility, but the
President’s memorandum was released on February 28, 2005. This decision was handed down by the Court on March 25, 2008—more than three
full years later. To assume that Congress had simply not noticed or that they
were somehow unable to act in disapproval for want of time is absurd. The
only reasonable conclusion is that Congress acquiesced in the President’s
actions putting him squarely in the middle category of Justice Jackson’s
scheme and arming him with the authority to instruct the states to comply
with Avena.
While I disagree with the Court’s assessment of where the President’s
authority vis-à-vis the memorandum falls within Justice Jackson’s tripartite
112. Id. at 635.
113. Id. at 637.
114. Id.
115. Medellin v. Texas (Medellin II), 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1368 (2008) (quoting Youngstown, 343
U.S. at 585; Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 668 (1981)).
116. Id. at 1372.
117. Id. (quoting Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 29–30,
Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331 (2006) (Nos. 05-51 and 04-10566), 2006 WL 271823).
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scheme, the more interesting and more significant analysis is of the President’s foreign affairs authority to resolve claims disputes with foreign nations. By refusing to submit to the argument that this power encompasses
the President’s memorandum, the Court has substantially limited the President’s authority in an area where it had appeared well established. In prior
decisions the Court had “recognized that the President has authority to
make ‘executive agreements’ with other countries, requiring no ratification
by the Senate or approval by Congress, this power having been exercised
since the early years of the Republic.”118 These agreements have been used
liberally by virtually every U.S. president to settle matters large and small
and have, until now, been considered a flexible tool for the settling of international controversies.119 Their uses have even extended to trumping State
law when necessary and the Court has previously recognized the legitimacy
of such action, noting that “the power of a State to refuse enforcement of
rights based on foreign law which runs counter to the public policy of the
forum must give way before the superior Federal policy evidenced by a
treaty or international compact or agreement.”120 Similarly, the Court has
also held that “even treaties with foreign nations will be carefully construed
so as not to derogate from the authority and jurisdiction of the States of this
nation unless clearly necessary to effectuate the national policy.”121 This
position makes the majority’s holding in Medellin II all the more remarkable since surely there can be no better barometer of national policy and
what is necessary to effectuate it than the President himself. In releasing the
memorandum directing compliance with the Avena decision, the President
was recognizing, as the Court has in the past, that “[f]requently the obligation of a treaty will be dependent on state law.”122 Knowing, then, that it
was clearly necessary in the interest of national policy to derogate from the
authority and jurisdiction of the States to “vindicate United States interests
in ensuring the reciprocal observance of the Vienna Convention, protecting
relations with foreign governments, and demonstrating commitment to the
role of international law,” the President sought to act pursuant to his recognized authority.123 In refusing to recognize this authority then, the Court
has, at the very least, considerably narrowed its previous position.

118. Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 415 (2003).
119. Id. (quoting LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
219, 496, n.163 (2d ed. 1996)).
120. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 230–31 (1942) (emphasis added); see Griffin v.
McCoach, 313 U.S. 498, 506 (1941).
121. Pink, 315 U.S. at 230 (emphasis added); see Guaranty Trust Co. of N.Y. v. United States,
304 U.S. 126, 143 (1938) and cases cited.
122. Pink, 315 U.S. at 230; see Prevost v. Greneaux, 60 U.S. 1 (1856).
123. Medellin v. Texas (Medellin II), 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1366 (2008).
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Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon (2006)
While Medellı́n was making its arduous journey back and forth between Texas and Washington D.C., another VCCR violation opinion was
handed down by the Supreme Court.124 On June 28, 2006, the Court issued
its decision in two consolidated cases involving foreign nationals who had
been arrested by state officers without being given the notification required
by the VCCR.125 Unlike any of the cases discussed in this article thus far,
Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon involved two foreign nationals neither of whom
were the subject of any ICJ proceedings.126 As a result, the holding of the
case does not advance our understanding of the complex and developing
relationship between the ICJ and the U.S. judiciary, but instead answers
some peripheral questions about possible remedies for VCCR violations
and, more importantly, outlines what questions the Supreme Court has left
unanswered.
The case from Oregon involved Moises Sanchez-Llamas, a Mexican
national who shot a police officer in the leg during an exchange of gunfire.127 Although Mr. Sanchez-Llamas was read his Miranda128 rights in
both English and Spanish when he was arrested, he was never informed of
his rights as a foreign national under the VCCR.129 During interrogation
Mr. Sanchez-Llamas made several incriminating statements that he later attempted to have suppressed because of the violation of his rights under the
VCCR.130 The trial court rejected his motion to suppress the statements and
he was convicted and sentenced to 20.5 years imprisonment.131 On successive appeals both the Oregon Court of Appeals and the Oregon Supreme
Court affirmed his conviction.132
The Virginia case, consolidated with Sanchez-Llamas for the purpose
of certiorari review, involved Mario Bustillo, a Honduran national convicted of murdering James Merry with a baseball bat outside a restaurant in
Springfield, Virginia, on the night of December 10, 1997.133 Mr. Bustillo
was never informed of his rights to consular help under the VCCR despite
124. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331 (2006).
125. The cases were Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, and Bustillo v. Johnson, 224 F.
App’x. 221 (2007), a Virginia case. Frederic L. Kirgis, The Supreme Court Decides a Consular
Convention Case, ASIL INSIGHTS, July 7, 2006, para. 1, http://www.asil.org/insights/2006/07/insights060707.html#_ednref1 [hereinafter Kirgis, Supreme Court Decides].
126. Kirgis, Texas Court, supra note 37, para. 5.
127. Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 338–40.
128. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (explaining that statements obtained from defendants during incommunicado interrogation in a police-dominated atmosphere, without full
warning of constitutional rights, are inadmissible as having been obtained in violation of the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination).
129. Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 340–41.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
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the fact that his defense hinged on his identity being confused with another
Honduran national who allegedly fled the country following the murder.134
Mr. Bustillo never raised the issue of a VCCR violation at trial but attempted to do so for the first time after his conviction when he filed a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus in state court.135 The state habeas court
dismissed Mr. Bustillo’s VCCR claim on the now-familiar grounds of procedural default and the Supreme Court of Virginia denied his petition for
appeal.136
Certiorari was granted on these two cases from opposite sides of the
country to answer three specific questions:
(1) whether Article 36 of the Vienna Convention grants rights that
may be invoked by individuals in a judicial proceeding; (2)
whether suppression of evidence is a proper remedy for a violation of Article 36; and (3) whether an Article 36 claim may be
deemed forfeited under state procedural rules because a defendant
failed to raise the claim at trial.137
The Court dealt with these questions in reverse order and having decided
the second and third found it unnecessary to decide the first.138 Having
gone unanswered by the Supreme Court then, the first question will be addressed in Part III.
On the issue of suppression of evidence as a remedy for a VCCR violation, the Court found that automatic suppression is an “entirely American
legal creation” that is “still ‘universally rejected’ by other countries.”139
Consequently, it would be virtually impossible for a defendant to enjoy suppression of evidence as a judicially-imposed remedy for a VCCR violation
in any of the 169 other countries party to the Convention and, therefore,
“startling” if the Convention itself were read to require suppression.140 In
response to the argument that since suppression is the appropriate remedy
for a violation of a defendant’s Miranda rights in the United States it is also
appropriate for a VCCR violation, the Court held that “‘[i]t is beyond dispute that we do not hold a supervisory power over the courts of the several
States.’”141 Given this and given that the VCCR does not itself identify a
remedy for its violation, the Court was loath to impose one on the States.
Next, the Court turned its attention to the issue of procedural default as
a bar to raising a VCCR claim for the first time on appeal. This was an issue
that had been addressed by the Supreme Court in Breard, but it was also
134. Id.
135. Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 341.
136. Id. at 342.
137. Id.
138. Kirgis, Supreme Court Decides, supra note 125, para. 3.
139. Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 343 (quoting Craig M. Bradley, Mapp Goes Abroad, 52
CASE W. RES. L. REV., 375, 399–400 (2001)).
140. Id. at 344.
141. Id. at 345 (quoting Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 438 (2000)).
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directly addressed by the ICJ in Avena.142 As discussed supra, in Avena the
ICJ specifically instructed U.S. courts to disregard procedural default in
their review and reconsideration of the cases that were the subject of that
action.143 Despite the arguments of Mr. Bustillo and several amici, however, the Court held that although the ICJ’s interpretation deserved “respectful consideration,” it did not obligate the Court to revisit its decision in
Breard.144 Refusing to analogize a VCCR violation to a Brady145 claim, the
Court instead continued to hold that a VCCR violation, like a Miranda violation, is procedurally barred from being raised for the first time in a postconviction proceeding.146 Given these holdings on two of the three
questions presented, I would now like to turn to the questions that have
been left open by the Supreme Court’s VCCR decisions.
PART III – WHAT REMAINS UNANSWERED
Although there are myriad questions about how U.S. states’ failures to
comply with the requirements of the VCCR can and should be addressed, as
well as an equally large number of questions about how the U.S. criminal
justice system should interact with international tribunals, the unanswered
issues I aim to explore in this section are limited to: (1) Does Article 36 of
the VCCR confer privately-enforceable rights on individual foreign nationals?; and (2) following the Medellin II decision, is future U.S. compliance
with the VCCR a pipedream?147 I will discuss them in order.
Unfortunately for those interested, the Supreme Court in Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon passed over the first question it granted certiorari to answer:
whether Article 36 of the VCCR confers privately-enforceable rights on
individual foreign nationals. This question was given virtually identical
treatment by the Court two years later in Medellin II. Although it was perhaps unnecessary to directly decide this question to resolve either case, it is
arguably the most important issue within the sphere of VCCR jurisprudence. Whether individuals can privately enforce their VCCR-bestowed
rights is central to what the resulting litigation will look like and more importantly, how accessible and responsive the judiciary will be to those
individuals.
142. Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12, 65
(Judgment of Mar. 31).
143. Id. at 57.
144. Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 353.
145. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (holding that failure of the prosecution to disclose known exculpatory evidence denies the defendant due process as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment).
146. Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 359–60.
147. These questions, among others, were first posed by MARK WARREN, HUMAN RIGHTS
RESEARCH, CONSULAR NOTIFICATION AND ASSISTANCE: A GUIDE FOR DEFENSE ATTORNEYS
(2007), http://www3.sympatico.ca/aiwarren/attorneys.htm #Sanlamas.
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In the opening paragraphs of its opinion in Sanchez-Llamas the Court
makes it clear that it “assume[s], without deciding, that Article 36 does
grant [Mr.] Bustillo and [Mr.] Sanchez-Llamas” individually enforceable
rights.148 This same disclaimer also graces the pages of the Medellin II
opinion.149 Attorneys for the United States, on the other hand, have argued
vigorously through virtually all of the litigation outlined above, that the
VCCR only confers rights on the states that are party to it, and not to their
individual citizens.150 This argument has proven attractive to quite a few
“of the Courts of Appeals [which] have presumed that treaties do not create
privately enforceable rights in the absence of express language to the contrary.”151 In their Brief to the Court in Sanchez-Llamas, the respondents
quoted a nineteenth century case which held that “‘there is a presumption
that a treaty will be enforced through political and diplomatic channels,
rather than through the courts.’”152 This presumption may well have been
true at the time it was written, and for that matter might still be true today if
the subject of a treaty was the position of a border or size of a fleet, but it is
not true if the subject is the rights of individual foreign nationals. The issues
at stake when a VCCR violation occurs are not the stuff of high politics but
rather the individual and very personal rights of a foreigner to talk to someone from his or her own country. If there is one lesson that can be gleaned
from the cases outlined above it is that countries do not move quickly. Time
and again these cases were filed mere days or, in the Motion for Leave to
File a Complaint with the Supreme Court in the LaGrand case, hours before
a scheduled execution. To rule that the VCCR confers no privately-enforceable rights on individuals covered by the Convention is to rule that the
Convention is unenforceable in U.S. courts. Is it possible then, that despite
the Court’s consistent assumptions to the contrary, it has already implicitly
decided that the VCCR does not confer privately-enforceable rights on
individuals?
A decade ago the Breard Court hinted that it considered VCCR rights
to be privately-enforceable, noting that the VCCR “arguably confers on an
individual the right to consular assistance following arrest.”153 All this
changed, however, when the Medellin II Court found that the ICJ’s orders
enforcing the VCCR were not judicially enforceable. Although it formally
148. Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 343 (emphasis added).
149. Medellin v. Texas (Medellin II), 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1357 n.4 (2008).
150. Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 343.
151. Medellin II, 128 S. Ct. at 1357 n.3; see, e.g., United States v. Emuegbunam, 268 F.3d
377, 389 (6th Cir. 2001); United States v. Jimenez-Nava, 243 F.3d 192, 195 (5th Cir. 2001);
United States v. Li, 206 F.3d 56, 60–61 (1st Cir. 2000) (en banc); Goldstar (Panama) S.A. v.
United States, 967 F.2d 965, 968 (4th Cir. 1992); Canadian Transp. Co. v. United States, 663 F.2d
1081, 1092 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1298
(3d Cir. 1979).
152. Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 343 (quoting Edye v. Robertson (Head Money Cases), 112
U.S. 580, 598 (1884)).
153. Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 376 (1998).
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sidestepped the issue of individual rights, the Court will be loath to enforce
such rights in future cases when it has already proclaimed that direct instructions from the World Court to give effect to the VCCR hold no sway in
domestic U.S. courts.
Moving to question (2), it would be unfair to imply that the Court is
declaring U.S. compliance with the VCCR and, more to the point, the ICJ’s
ruling in Avena, a lost cause. Although this latest decision has the effect of
prolonging U.S. noncompliance with the ICJ, the Court’s position is that it
is unable to remedy the situation, bound as it is by its inability “‘to disregard the existing laws on the subject.’”154 In reality, the Court is washing
its hands of the issue and declaring compliance in this instance as exclusively within the purview of the legislative branch. Since, in the Court’s
view, the VCCR is non-self-executing, it “‘can only be enforced pursuant
to legislation to carry [its stipulations] into effect,’”155 “[t]he responsibility
for [which] . . . falls to Congress.”156 Under these circumstances then, Congress’s acquiescence, or lack thereof, to the President’s actions is irrelevant
to the Court and “whether the treaty will ever have [its intended] effect is
governed by the fundamental constitutional principle that ‘[t]he power to
make the necessary laws is in Congress . . . .’”157 Whether Congress will
heed this message and spring into action to restore the U.S.’s good name on
the world stage remains to be seen.
If Congress did take up the gauntlet cast down by the Court and began
to fashion a legislative cure for U.S. noncompliance with Avena, the shape
that cure would take would be an issue of not inconsiderable controversy.
The federal government must tread softly lest it disturb the balance struck
by the Tenth Amendment.158 As illustrated by the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals’ rejection of the President’s instruction to give effect to the ICJ’s
Avena decision, the several States are loath to cede an ounce more sovereignty to the federal government than is demanded by the Constitution.
Moreover, where police powers are involved, the case for the States’ right
to reject federal legislation is a strong one. This makes a congressional edict
directly mandating compliance with Avena vulnerable to a constitutional
challenge, and therefore improbable. Such direct federal action would give
rise to an issue similar to, but distinguishable from, that at the heart of

154. Medellin II, 128 S. Ct. at 1368 (quoting Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253, 315 (1829)
(overruled on other grounds)).
155. Id. (quoting Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888)).
156. Id.
157. Id. at 1369 (quoting Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 591 (2006)) (quoting Ex Parte
Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 139 (1866) (opinion of Chase, C.J.)).
158. U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”).
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Missouri v. Holland.159 In Missouri v. Holland the federal government negotiated a treaty with the United Kingdom which subsequently allowed federal regulation of the hunting of migratory birds in Missouri and the other
States. The treaty provided the constitutional grounds for enforcement of
something the federal government could not enforce through direct legislation. In contrast, the current situation contemplates direct legislation to enforce an international tribunal’s resolution of a dispute about a longstanding
treaty. Although the States may feel that in both instances a treaty is permitting the federal government to interfere in an area from which it was heretofore excluded, the motive and circumstances involved are quite dissimilar.
Those who feel that federal legislation to enforce the Avena decision
evokes Missouri v. Holland would do well to note that the Court has already held the VCCR and the Optional Protocol to be non-self-executing.
The Bricker Amendment,160 proposed in the wake of the Missouri v. Holland decision to prevent federal tampering with the States’ constitutional
rights through the use of treaties, called for a treaty to “become effective as
internal law in the United States only through legislation which would be
valid in the absence of treaty.”161 Although the Bricker Amendment failed
by a single vote to gain the requisite two thirds majority in the Senate, the
Supreme Court has brought about one of the failed amendment’s major
goals by finding a presumption against self-executing treaties.
Although Missouri v. Holland technically still represents good law, it
is unclear whether it is a hook upon which Congress can hang the weighty
hat of Avena compliance. Should it prove insufficient for the task, Congress’s next most valuable tool in trying to craft legislation to enforce the
Avena decision will likely be the power of the purse. The Spending Clause
of the U.S. Constitution gives the federal government the power to spend
the revenues raised by taxation in order to meet its objectives and goals.162
The Supreme Court has long held that Congress can also use its power to
spend to coerce favored conduct.163 In this case, for example, Congress
might be able to condition funding for State criminal law enforcement on
VCCR compliance or compliance with the ICJ’s decision in Avena.
159. 252 U.S. 416, 433–34 (1920) (holding that the federal government’s ability to make
treaties is supreme over any state concerns about such treaties having abrogated any states’ rights
arising under the Tenth Amendment).
160. S.J. Res. 1, 83d Cong. (as introduced by Sen. John Bricker, Jan. 7, 1953), 99 Cong. Rec.
160–61 (1953).
161. Arthur E. Sutherland, The Bricker Amendment, Executive Agreements, and Imported Potatoes, 67 HARV. L. REV. 281, 283–84 (1953) (emphasis added) (quoting from S.J. Res. 1, 83d
Cong. (as proposed by S. Comm. on the Judiciary, June 15, 1953), 99 Cong. Rec. 6449 (1953)).
162. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (“The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes,
Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general
Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the
United States”) (known as the Taxing and Spending Clause).
163. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987).
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The final mechanism available to Congress to give effect to the Avena
decision would be some amalgam of the powers granted to it under Article I
of the Constitution. In addition to the Spending Clause discussed supra,
there are creative arguments to be made under the Necessary and Proper
Clause164 as well as the Commerce Clause.165 If Congress chooses to look
upon human capital as a good traded in interstate commerce (since members of the workforce frequently cross state and international borders as the
labor market changes), it might be able to legislate Avena compliance in
this way.
CONCLUSION
As the court of last resort in the United States, the Supreme Court has
had the opportunity to acknowledge and shape the domestic judicial response to international jurisprudence involving the United States. In the series of decisions relating to VCCR compliance the Court has decided that a
judicial response is impossible and what is required is legislative action. In
so holding, it has made a decision that will, absent swift congressional action on a complex issue, greatly affect U.S. standing on the world stage.
This is not lost on the Court:
The entire Court and the President agree that breach [of compliance with the ICJ’s ruling in Avena] will jeopardize the United
States’ ‘plainly compelling’ interests in ‘ensuring the reciprocal
observance of the Vienna Convention, protecting relations with
foreign governments, and demonstrating commitment to the role
of international law.’ When the honor of the Nation is balanced
against the modest cost of compliance, Texas would do well to
recognize that more is at stake than whether judgments of the ICJ,
and the principled admonitions of the President of the United
States, trump state procedural rules in the absence of implementing legislation.166
This admonition, buried as it is at the end of a lengthy opinion upholding
the right of Texas’s courts to openly defy the considered judgment of the
World Court and the President of the United States, will do little good in the
scheme of things. Perhaps Justice Breyer alone realizes the true gravity of
the decisions that have been made in the past decade with regard to the
VCCR. As he noted in his dissent in Medellin, “[i]n a world where commerce, trade, and travel have become ever more international, [this] is a
step in the wrong direction.”167
164. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
165. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
166. Medellin v. Texas (Medellin II), 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1375 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring)
(internal citations omitted).
167. Id. at 1389 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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Compliance with the VCCR, and now compliance with the ICJ, are not
luxuries to be indulged in when times are good and disregarded when it’s
politically unfavorable. They are commitments that we, as the land of the
free and home of the brave, have made to the world. Whether we honor
these commitments in a better-late-than-never fashion is now in the hands
of our elected Congress. They must act quickly and decisively to give effect
to the ICJ’s Avena decision and to ensure continuing and complete VCCR
compliance if for no other reason than that the treatment of the millions of
Americans who travel abroad each year hangs in the balance.

